Reasons and testimony

Sanford C Goldberg*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

This chapter explores the nature of the sort of reason another's say-so or testimony provides. The key question concerns the epistemic significance of S's having testified that p. According to the reductionist view, the epistemic significance of another's say-so is reduced to the epistemic significance of the audience's reasons to think that say-so was reliable. Anti-reductionism, by contrast, holds that testimony that p stands by default, in a way analogous to S's having perceived that p standing by default as a defeasible reason to believe that p. In this chapter I develop the case for each position, and the topic is connected to other issues at the heart of the epistemology of testimony.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationThe Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages662-684
Number of pages23
ISBN (Print)9780199657889
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 10 2018

Fingerprint

Testimony
Antireductionism
Reductionist
Epistemology

Keywords

  • Anti-reductionism
  • Defeaters
  • Epistemology of testimony
  • Reductionism
  • Social epistemology
  • Testimony

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Cite this

Goldberg, S. C. (2018). Reasons and testimony. In The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity (pp. 662-684). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.29
Goldberg, Sanford C. / Reasons and testimony. The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press, 2018. pp. 662-684
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Goldberg, SC 2018, Reasons and testimony. in The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press, pp. 662-684. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.29

Reasons and testimony. / Goldberg, Sanford C.

The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press, 2018. p. 662-684.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

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Goldberg SC. Reasons and testimony. In The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press. 2018. p. 662-684 https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.29