Reasons for reasons

Baron Reed

doi:10.1017/epi.2015.27

Reasons for reasons

Baron Reed^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Review article › peer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

Hilary Kornblith explores the prospects for reasons eliminationism, the view that reasons ought not to be regarded as being of central importance in epistemology. I reply by conceding that reasons may not be necessary for knowledge, in at least some cases, but I argue that they are nevertheless vitally important in epistemology more broadly. Their importance stems from being necessary, not for knowledge but for us, given that we are social agents with practical concerns. In that sense, we have (social and practical) reasons for (having a practice of giving and receiving epistemic) reasons.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	241-247
Number of pages	7
Journal	Episteme
Volume	12
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.27
State	Published - Jun 16 2015

ASJC Scopus subject areas

History and Philosophy of Science

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10.1017/epi.2015.27

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Reasons for reasons

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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