TY - JOUR
T1 - Receiver-centric congestion control with a misbehaving receiver
T2 - Vulnerabilities and end-point solutions
AU - Kuzmanovic, Aleksandar
AU - Knightly, E. W.
N1 - Funding Information:
Edward W. Knightly is a professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering at Rice University. He received his B.S. degree from Auburn University in 1991 and the M.S. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of California at Berkeley in 1992 and 1996, respectively. He is an associate editor of IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking. He served as technical co-chair of IEEE IWQoS 1998 and IEEE INFOCOM 2005 and served on the program committee for numerous networking conferences including ICNP, INFOCOM, IWQoS, MobiCom, and SIGMETRICS. He received the National Science Foundation CAREER Award in 1997 and the Sloan Fellowship in 2001. His research interests are in the areas of mobile and wireless networks and high-performance and denial-of-service resilient protocol design.
PY - 2007/7/11
Y1 - 2007/7/11
N2 - Receiver-driven TCP protocols delegate key congestion control functions to receivers. Their goal is to exploit information available only at receivers in order to improve latency and throughput in diverse scenarios ranging from wireless access links to wireline and wireless web browsing. Unfortunately, in contrast to today's sender-driven protocols, receiver-driven congestion control introduces an incentive for misbehavior. Namely, the primary beneficiary of a flow (the receiver of data) has both the means and incentive to manipulate the congestion control algorithm in order to obtain higher throughput or reduced latency. In this paper, we study the deployability of receiver-driven TCP in environments with untrusted receivers which may tamper with the congestion control algorithm for their own benefit. Using analytical modeling and extensive simulation experiments, we show that deployment of receiver-driven TCP must strike a balance between enforcement mechanisms, which can limit performance, and complete trust of endpoints, which results in vulnerability to cheaters and even DoS attackers.
AB - Receiver-driven TCP protocols delegate key congestion control functions to receivers. Their goal is to exploit information available only at receivers in order to improve latency and throughput in diverse scenarios ranging from wireless access links to wireline and wireless web browsing. Unfortunately, in contrast to today's sender-driven protocols, receiver-driven congestion control introduces an incentive for misbehavior. Namely, the primary beneficiary of a flow (the receiver of data) has both the means and incentive to manipulate the congestion control algorithm in order to obtain higher throughput or reduced latency. In this paper, we study the deployability of receiver-driven TCP in environments with untrusted receivers which may tamper with the congestion control algorithm for their own benefit. Using analytical modeling and extensive simulation experiments, we show that deployment of receiver-driven TCP must strike a balance between enforcement mechanisms, which can limit performance, and complete trust of endpoints, which results in vulnerability to cheaters and even DoS attackers.
KW - Congestion control
KW - Misbehavior
KW - Performance
KW - Receiver-centric TCP
KW - Trust
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=34247615419&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=34247615419&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.comnet.2006.11.021
DO - 10.1016/j.comnet.2006.11.021
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:34247615419
SN - 1389-1286
VL - 51
SP - 2717
EP - 2737
JO - Computer Networks
JF - Computer Networks
IS - 10
ER -