@article{023ccff81c974d6294ff3689b1b76ab0,
title = "Reciprocity and Cooperation in Repeated Coordination Games: The Principled-Player Approach",
abstract = "Two long-lived players play a repeated coordination game. I show the restrictions on players' beliefs which imply that cooperation is optimal play. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D83.",
keywords = "Repeated games, bounded rationality, cooperation, equilibrium selection, learning",
author = "Alvaro Sandroni",
note = "Funding Information: 1I had the benefit of extensive conversations with Ehud Kalai whose ideas were fundamental in realizing this project. I also thank Eddie Dekel, George Mailath, Juuso Valimaki, and two anonymous referees for useful suggestions. This paper began in a conversation with Rann Smorodinsky who helped me on many occasions. Financial support under NSF Grant SBR 9730385, BSF Grant 97-00113/1, and the Bergmann Memorial Research Grant is gratefully acknowledged. All errors are mine.",
year = "2000",
month = aug,
doi = "10.1006/game.1998.0761",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "32",
pages = "157--182",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
number = "2",
}