Reciprocity and Cooperation in Repeated Coordination Games: The Principled-Player Approach

Alvaro Sandroni*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

8 Scopus citations

Abstract

Two long-lived players play a repeated coordination game. I show the restrictions on players' beliefs which imply that cooperation is optimal play. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D83.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)157-182
Number of pages26
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume32
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 2000

Keywords

  • Repeated games
  • bounded rationality
  • cooperation
  • equilibrium selection
  • learning

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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