Regulatory reform for diversified public utilities: For better or for worse?

Ronald R. Braeutigam*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

This article examines the difficulties of regulating public utilities which serve both noncompetitive and competitive markets. Problems with the administration of traditional rate of return regulation as utilities have diversified into competitive markets have led regulators to consider adopting alternative forms of regulation that allow the firm and the customers in noncompetitive markets to share in the economic benefits of production, including 'price cap' regulation. The article examines the efficacy of price caps as one possible form of regulatory bargain, both as a theoretical ideal and as they have been applied in practice. It also addresses explicitly the nature of another type of regulatory bargain designed to distribute net economic benefits to consumers and the firm.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)103-122
Number of pages20
JournalResources and Energy
Volume14
Issue number1-2
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1992

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Environmental Science
  • General Earth and Planetary Sciences

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