Reliabilism in philosophy

Sanford C Goldberg

doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9300-7

Reliabilism in philosophy

Sanford C Goldberg

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

39 Scopus citations

Abstract

The following three propositions appear to be individually defensible but jointly inconsistent: (1) reliability is a necessary condition on epistemic justification; (2) on contested matters in philosophy, my beliefs are not reliably formed; (3) some of these beliefs are epistemically justified. I explore the nature and scope of the problem, examine and reject some candidate solutions, compare the issue with ones arising in discussions about disagreement, and offer a brief assessment of our predicament.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	105-117
Number of pages	13
Journal	Philosophical Studies
Volume	142
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9300-7
State	Published - Jan 1 2009

Keywords

Disagreement
Philosophical methodology
Reliabilism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Philosophy

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10.1007/s11098-008-9300-7

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Reliabilism in philosophy

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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