Reliabilism in philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

16 Scopus citations

Abstract

The following three propositions appear to be individually defensible but jointly inconsistent: (1) reliability is a necessary condition on epistemic justification; (2) on contested matters in philosophy, my beliefs are not reliably formed; (3) some of these beliefs are epistemically justified. I explore the nature and scope of the problem, examine and reject some candidate solutions, compare the issue with ones arising in discussions about disagreement, and offer a brief assessment of our predicament.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)105-117
Number of pages13
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume142
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2009

Keywords

  • Disagreement
  • Philosophical methodology
  • Reliabilism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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