Reliability and knowledge in the epistemology of testimony

Jennifer Lackey*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

Abstract

What is at the center of the epistemology of testimony: reliability or knowledge? This is the key question that Elizabeth Fricker takes up in her "How to Make Invidious Distinctions Amongst Reliable Testifiers". In particular, Fricker argues that there are several important reasons to favor understanding testimonial knowledge in terms of the speaker being a knower rather than merely a reliable source of information. In this short response, I raise problems for Fricker's view and the arguments put forth to support it. I conclude that contrary to Fricker's thesis, the epistemology of testimony should focus on speaker reliability rather than knowledge.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)203-208
Number of pages6
JournalEpisteme
Volume12
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2015

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • History and Philosophy of Science

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