Repeated Implementation

Ehud Kalai*, John O. Ledyard

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

22 Scopus citations

Abstract

In the traditional static implementation literature it is often impossible for implementors to enforce their optimal outcomes. And when restricting the choice to dominant-strategy implementation, only the dictatorial choices of one of the participants are implementable. Repeated implementation problems are drastically different. This paper provides a strong implementation "folk theorem:" for patient implementors, every outcome function they care about is dominant-strategy implementable.journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C7, D7.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)308-317
Number of pages10
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume83
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1998

Funding

* The authors thank Andreas Blume, Tim Feddersen, Alvaro Sandroni, and a referee of this journal for helpful suggestions. Kalai’s research is partly supported by NSF Economics Grant SBR-955421. Ledyard’s research is partly supported by the New Millenium Project Office of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of NASA.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Repeated Implementation'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this