Representing preferences with a unique subjective state space: A corrigendum

Eddie Dekel*, Barton L. Lipman, Aldo Rustichini, Todd Sarver

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

44 Scopus citations


Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001) (henceforth DLR) axiomatically characterized three representations of preferences that allow for a desire for flexibility and/or commitment. In one of these representations (ordinal expected utility), the independence axiom is stated in a weaker form than is necessary to obtain the representation; in another (additive expected utility), the continuity axiom is too weak. In this erratum we provide examples showing that the axioms used by DLR are not sufficient, and provide stronger versions of these axioms that, together with the other axioms used by DLR, are necessary and sufficient for these two representations.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)591-600
Number of pages10
Issue number2
StatePublished - Mar 2007


  • Expected utility
  • Preference for commitment
  • Preference for flexibility
  • Subjective state space

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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