Abstract
Is it a good objection to a moral theory that it demands a great deal of individual agents? I argue that if we interpret the question to be about the potential welfare costs associated with our moral obligations, the answer must be "no." However, the demands a moral theory makes can also be measured in terms of what it requires us to take responsibility for. I argue that this is distinct from what we may be required to do or give up, and that it provides a conception of demandingness that makes better sense of our intuitive reactions.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 315-338 |
Number of pages | 24 |
Journal | Journal of Moral Philosophy |
Volume | 14 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jan 1 2017 |
Keywords
- agent-centered prerogative
- answerability
- demandingness
- impartiality
- responsibility
- utilitarianism
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy