Abstract
I formalize the notion of equilibrium language, define the relation of having a richer language, and show the existence of equilibria with maximally rich language. I also study the stability of equilibria with respect to inflows of messages that can enrich their language, and provide examples of implausible cheap-talk equilibria, not refined away by the existing refinements, which can be refined away on the grounds of stability properties.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 164-186 |
Number of pages | 23 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
Volume | 128 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - May 1 2006 |
Keywords
- Cheap-talk games
- Equilibrium refinements
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics