Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria

Wojciech Olszewski*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

I formalize the notion of equilibrium language, define the relation of having a richer language, and show the existence of equilibria with maximally rich language. I also study the stability of equilibria with respect to inflows of messages that can enrich their language, and provide examples of implausible cheap-talk equilibria, not refined away by the existing refinements, which can be refined away on the grounds of stability properties.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)164-186
Number of pages23
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume128
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - May 1 2006

Keywords

  • Cheap-talk games
  • Equilibrium refinements

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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