TY - JOUR
T1 - Risk Measurement and Hedging
T2 - With and Without Derivatives
AU - Petersen, Mitchell A.
AU - Thiagarajan, S. Ramu
N1 - Copyright:
Copyright 2018 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2000
Y1 - 2000
N2 - This paper examines a setting in which the derivatives strategies of two firms are known, but completely different. One firm aggressively hedges its risk using derivatives. The other firm uses a combination of operating and financial decisions, but no derivatives, to manage its risk. The different choice of methods is a result of different abilities to adjust operating costs and different needs for investment capital. Managerial incentives also play a role. Although risk-averse managers have an incentive to reduce risk, how and how much they hedge depends on how they are compensated.
AB - This paper examines a setting in which the derivatives strategies of two firms are known, but completely different. One firm aggressively hedges its risk using derivatives. The other firm uses a combination of operating and financial decisions, but no derivatives, to manage its risk. The different choice of methods is a result of different abilities to adjust operating costs and different needs for investment capital. Managerial incentives also play a role. Although risk-averse managers have an incentive to reduce risk, how and how much they hedge depends on how they are compensated.
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U2 - 10.2307/3666367
DO - 10.2307/3666367
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0347013785
SN - 0046-3892
VL - 29
SP - 5
EP - 30
JO - Financial Management
JF - Financial Management
IS - 4
ER -