TY - JOUR
T1 - Robust trading mechanisms
AU - Hagerty, Kathleen M.
AU - Rogerson, William P.
N1 - Funding Information:
* We would like to acknowledge extremely helpful comments and discussions with Roger Myerson. Rogerson’s work was supported by NSF Grant SES-8504034. ’ See D’Aspermont and Gerard-Varet [2], Laffont and Maskin [S], Myerson [6], Vickery [9], and Wilson [lo, 11, 121 for related literature.
PY - 1987/6
Y1 - 1987/6
N2 - We consider the problem of designing a trading institution for a single buyer and seller when their valuation of the good is private information. It is shown that posted-price mechanisms are essentially the only mechanisms such that each trader has a dominant strategy. A posted-price mechanism is one where a price is posted in advance and trade occurs if and only if all traders agree to trade.
AB - We consider the problem of designing a trading institution for a single buyer and seller when their valuation of the good is private information. It is shown that posted-price mechanisms are essentially the only mechanisms such that each trader has a dominant strategy. A posted-price mechanism is one where a price is posted in advance and trade occurs if and only if all traders agree to trade.
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U2 - 10.1016/0022-0531(87)90104-9
DO - 10.1016/0022-0531(87)90104-9
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:45949116101
VL - 42
SP - 94
EP - 107
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
SN - 0022-0531
IS - 1
ER -