Abstract
This paper studies the robustness of symmetric equilibria in anonymous local games to perturbations of prior beliefs. Two priors are strategically close on a class of games if players receive similar expected payoffs in equilibrium under the priors, for any game in that class. I show that if the structure of payoff interdependencies is sparse in a well-defined sense, the conditions for strategic proximity in anonymous local games are strictly weaker than the conditions for general Bayesian games of Kajii and Morris (1998) [11] when attention is restricted to symmetric equilibria. Hence, by exploiting the properties of anonymous local games, it is possible to obtain stronger robustness results for this class.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 300-325 |
Number of pages | 26 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
Volume | 146 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jan 2011 |
Keywords
- Anonymous games
- Heterogeneous externalities
- Higher-order beliefs
- Incomplete information
- Local interactions
- Network games
- Robustness
- Strategic proximity
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics