Robustness of equilibria in anonymous local games

Willemien Kets*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper studies the robustness of symmetric equilibria in anonymous local games to perturbations of prior beliefs. Two priors are strategically close on a class of games if players receive similar expected payoffs in equilibrium under the priors, for any game in that class. I show that if the structure of payoff interdependencies is sparse in a well-defined sense, the conditions for strategic proximity in anonymous local games are strictly weaker than the conditions for general Bayesian games of Kajii and Morris (1998) [11] when attention is restricted to symmetric equilibria. Hence, by exploiting the properties of anonymous local games, it is possible to obtain stronger robustness results for this class.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)300-325
Number of pages26
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume146
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2011

Keywords

  • Anonymous games
  • Heterogeneous externalities
  • Higher-order beliefs
  • Incomplete information
  • Local interactions
  • Network games
  • Robustness
  • Strategic proximity

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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