School accountability and teacher mobility

Li Feng, David N Figlio*, Tim Sass

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We exploit a 2002 change in Florida's school accountability system, and use regression discontinuity and difference-in-difference approaches, to study the effects of accountability pressure on teacher mobility. While school grading “shocks” do not affect mobility at most parts of the measured school quality distribution, there exists strong evidence that teachers are more likely to leave schools that have received a failing grade. Receipt of an “F” grade translates into differently higher turnover for the best teachers, measured by contributions to student test scores, at a school. These results are robust to a wide range of parametric and nonparametric model specifications.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-17
Number of pages17
JournalJournal of Urban Economics
Volume103
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2018

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accountability
responsibility
teacher
school
grading
turnover
discontinuity
student
School accountability
regression
evidence

Keywords

  • Administrative data
  • School accountability
  • Teacher labor markets
  • Teacher quality

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Urban Studies

Cite this

Feng, Li ; Figlio, David N ; Sass, Tim. / School accountability and teacher mobility. In: Journal of Urban Economics. 2018 ; Vol. 103. pp. 1-17.
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School accountability and teacher mobility. / Feng, Li; Figlio, David N; Sass, Tim.

In: Journal of Urban Economics, Vol. 103, 01.01.2018, p. 1-17.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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