Search for an object with two attributes

Wojciech Olszewski*, Asher Wolinsky

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper presents and analyzes a simple equilibrium search model. On one side, there is a population of searchers; on the other side, a population of objects. Searchers are strategic decision makers who are there to get matched to an object, while objects have no preferences or decisions to make. The main novelty is that an object is characterized by two attributes, but a searcher can observe only one at the point of decision. This generates some interesting phenomena such as multiplicity of equilibria, in some of which the searcher's payoff is a discontinuous function of the observed attribute and the adoption decision is not everywhere monotonic in the observed attribute.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)145-160
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume161
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2016

Keywords

  • Attributes
  • Matching
  • Search

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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