Search for an object with two attributes

Wojciech Olszewski; Asher Wolinsky

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.004

Search for an object with two attributes

Wojciech Olszewski^*, Asher Wolinsky

^*Corresponding author for this work

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper presents and analyzes a simple equilibrium search model. On one side, there is a population of searchers; on the other side, a population of objects. Searchers are strategic decision makers who are there to get matched to an object, while objects have no preferences or decisions to make. The main novelty is that an object is characterized by two attributes, but a searcher can observe only one at the point of decision. This generates some interesting phenomena such as multiplicity of equilibria, in some of which the searcher's payoff is a discontinuous function of the observed attribute and the adoption decision is not everywhere monotonic in the observed attribute.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	145-160
Number of pages	16
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	161
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.004
State	Published - Jan 1 2016

Keywords

Attributes
Matching
Search

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.004

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title = "Search for an object with two attributes",

abstract = "This paper presents and analyzes a simple equilibrium search model. On one side, there is a population of searchers; on the other side, a population of objects. Searchers are strategic decision makers who are there to get matched to an object, while objects have no preferences or decisions to make. The main novelty is that an object is characterized by two attributes, but a searcher can observe only one at the point of decision. This generates some interesting phenomena such as multiplicity of equilibria, in some of which the searcher's payoff is a discontinuous function of the observed attribute and the adoption decision is not everywhere monotonic in the observed attribute.",

keywords = "Attributes, Matching, Search",

author = "Wojciech Olszewski and Asher Wolinsky",

note = "Funding Information: The authors gratefully acknowledge support from the NSF under grants SES-0644930 and SES-1123595 , respectively. We are grateful to Keiichi Kawai and Mikhail Safronov for their helpful research assistance, and to Philip H. Dybvig for comments and suggestions. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2015 Elsevier Inc.",

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AU - Olszewski, Wojciech

AU - Wolinsky, Asher

N1 - Funding Information: The authors gratefully acknowledge support from the NSF under grants SES-0644930 and SES-1123595 , respectively. We are grateful to Keiichi Kawai and Mikhail Safronov for their helpful research assistance, and to Philip H. Dybvig for comments and suggestions. Publisher Copyright: © 2015 Elsevier Inc.

PY - 2016/1/1

Y1 - 2016/1/1

N2 - This paper presents and analyzes a simple equilibrium search model. On one side, there is a population of searchers; on the other side, a population of objects. Searchers are strategic decision makers who are there to get matched to an object, while objects have no preferences or decisions to make. The main novelty is that an object is characterized by two attributes, but a searcher can observe only one at the point of decision. This generates some interesting phenomena such as multiplicity of equilibria, in some of which the searcher's payoff is a discontinuous function of the observed attribute and the adoption decision is not everywhere monotonic in the observed attribute.

AB - This paper presents and analyzes a simple equilibrium search model. On one side, there is a population of searchers; on the other side, a population of objects. Searchers are strategic decision makers who are there to get matched to an object, while objects have no preferences or decisions to make. The main novelty is that an object is characterized by two attributes, but a searcher can observe only one at the point of decision. This generates some interesting phenomena such as multiplicity of equilibria, in some of which the searcher's payoff is a discontinuous function of the observed attribute and the adoption decision is not everywhere monotonic in the observed attribute.

KW - Attributes

KW - Matching

KW - Search

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JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

SN - 0022-0531

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Search for an object with two attributes

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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