Search profiling with partial knowledge of deterrence

Charles F. Manski*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

36 Scopus citations


Consider the choice of a profiling policy where decisions to search for evidence of crime may vary with observable covariates of the persons at risk of search. I pose a planning problem whose objective is to minimise the social cost of crime and search. The consequences of a search rule depend on the extent to which search deters crime. I study the planning problem when the planner has partial knowledge of deterrence. I show how the planner can eliminate dominated search rules and how he can use the minimax or minimax-regret criterion to choose an undominated rule.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)F385-F401
JournalEconomic Journal
Issue number515
StatePublished - Nov 2006

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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