Secondary spectrum market: To acquire or not to acquire side information?

Arnob Ghosh; Saswati Sarkar; Randall Berry

doi:10.1109/ISIT.2016.7541576

Secondary spectrum market: To acquire or not to acquire side information?

Arnob Ghosh, Saswati Sarkar, Randall Berry

Electrical and Computer Engineering

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

In a secondary spectrum market primaries set prices for their unused channels to the secondaries. The payoff of a primary depends on the channel state information (CSI) of its competitors. We consider a model where a primary can acquire its competitors CSI at a cost. We formulate a game between two primaries where each primary decides whether to acquire its competitor's CSI or not and then selects its price based on that. Our result shows that no primary decide to acquire its competitor's CSI with an absolute certainty. When the cost of acquiring the CSI is above a threshold, there is a unique Nash Equilibrium (NE) where both the primaries remain uninformed of their respective competitor's CSI. When the cost is below the threshold, in the unique NE each primary randomizes between its decision to acquire the CSI or not. Our result reveals that irrespective of the cost of acquiring the CSI, the expected payoff of a primary remains the same.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	Proceedings - ISIT 2016; 2016 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages	1636-1640
Number of pages	5
ISBN (Electronic)	9781509018062
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/ISIT.2016.7541576
State	Published - Aug 10 2016
Event	2016 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2016 - Barcelona, Spain Duration: Jul 10 2016 → Jul 15 2016

Publication series

Name	IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings
Volume	2016-August
ISSN (Print)	2157-8095

Other

Other	2016 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2016
Country/Territory	Spain
City	Barcelona
Period	7/10/16 → 7/15/16

Funding

Arnob Ghosh and Saswati Sarkar are supported by NSF CNS 1525457. Randall Berry is supported in part by NSF grant AST-1343381

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Theoretical Computer Science
Information Systems
Modeling and Simulation
Applied Mathematics

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10.1109/ISIT.2016.7541576

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Ghosh, A., Sarkar, S., & Berry, R. (2016). Secondary spectrum market: To acquire or not to acquire side information? In Proceedings - ISIT 2016; 2016 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (pp. 1636-1640). Article 7541576 (IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings; Vol. 2016-August). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/ISIT.2016.7541576

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title = "Secondary spectrum market: To acquire or not to acquire side information?",

abstract = "In a secondary spectrum market primaries set prices for their unused channels to the secondaries. The payoff of a primary depends on the channel state information (CSI) of its competitors. We consider a model where a primary can acquire its competitors CSI at a cost. We formulate a game between two primaries where each primary decides whether to acquire its competitor's CSI or not and then selects its price based on that. Our result shows that no primary decide to acquire its competitor's CSI with an absolute certainty. When the cost of acquiring the CSI is above a threshold, there is a unique Nash Equilibrium (NE) where both the primaries remain uninformed of their respective competitor's CSI. When the cost is below the threshold, in the unique NE each primary randomizes between its decision to acquire the CSI or not. Our result reveals that irrespective of the cost of acquiring the CSI, the expected payoff of a primary remains the same.",

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Ghosh, A, Sarkar, S & Berry, R 2016, Secondary spectrum market: To acquire or not to acquire side information? in Proceedings - ISIT 2016; 2016 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory., 7541576, IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings, vol. 2016-August, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 1636-1640, 2016 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2016, Barcelona, Spain, 7/10/16. https://doi.org/10.1109/ISIT.2016.7541576

Secondary spectrum market: To acquire or not to acquire side information? / Ghosh, Arnob; Sarkar, Saswati; Berry, Randall.
Proceedings - ISIT 2016; 2016 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2016. p. 1636-1640 7541576 (IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings; Vol. 2016-August).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

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Secondary spectrum market: To acquire or not to acquire side information?

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