Secure signaling games for Gaussian multiple access wiretap channels

Hao Ge, Ruijie Xu, Randall A. Berry

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

A Gaussian multiple access wire-tap channel with confidential messages is studied, where multiple users attempt to transmit private messages to a legitimate receiver in the presence of an eavesdropper. While prior work focused on the case where the users were cooperative, we assume that each user is selfish and and so are modeled as playing a non-cooperative game. We assume all users send a superposition of two Gaussian codebooks: one for their confidential messages and one for 'filling' the evesdropper's channel. For such a scheme, we give a characterization of the achievable rate region defined by Tekin and Yener using polymatroid properties. We then use this to find the Nash equilibrium region for this non-cooperative game. Furthermore, we give algorithms for finding the best and worst Nash equilibria for a given channel.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings - 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2015
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages111-115
Number of pages5
ISBN (Electronic)9781467377041
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 28 2015
EventIEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2015 - Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Duration: Jun 14 2015Jun 19 2015

Publication series

NameIEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings
Volume2015-June
ISSN (Print)2157-8095

Other

OtherIEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2015
Country/TerritoryHong Kong
CityHong Kong
Period6/14/156/19/15

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Information Systems
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Applied Mathematics

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