Abstract
As the world's democratic institutions are challenged by dissatisfied citizens, political scientists and computer scientists have proposed and analyzed various (innovative) methods to select representative bodies, a crucial task in every democracy. However, a unified framework to analyze and compare different selection mechanisms is largely missing. To address this gap, we advocate employing concepts and tools from computational social choice to devise a model in which different selection mechanisms can be formalized. Such a model would allow for conceptualizing and evaluating desirable representation axioms. We make the first step in this direction by proposing a unifying mathematical formulation of different selection mechanisms as well as various social-choice-inspired axioms such as proportionality and monotonicity.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 2701-2705 |
| Number of pages | 5 |
| Journal | Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS |
| Volume | 2024-May |
| State | Published - 2024 |
| Event | 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2024 - Auckland, New Zealand Duration: May 6 2024 → May 10 2024 |
Funding
This project was initiated at the Lorentz Center workshop Algorithmic Technology for Democracy in October 2022 [29]. It received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (GA No 101002854) and from the AI Programme of ATI (UK), the Vannevar Bush Fellowship from the Office of Secretary to Defense, and ARO MURI W911-NF-19-1-0217.
Keywords
- (Computational) Social Choice
- Liquid Democracy
- Proportional Representation
- Proxy Voting
- Sortition
- Unifying Framework
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Artificial Intelligence
- Software
- Control and Systems Engineering