Self-knowledge and rationality

Baron Reed*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

There have been several recent attempts to account for the special authority of self-knowledge by grounding it in a constitutive relation between an agent's intentional states and her judgments about those intentional states. This constitutive relation is said to hold in virtue of the rationality of the subject. I argue, however, that there are two ways in which we have self-knowledge without there being such a constitutive relation between first-order intentional states and the second-order judgments about them. Recognition of this fact thus represents a significant challenge to the rational agency view.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)164-181
Number of pages18
JournalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume80
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2010

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • History and Philosophy of Science

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