Semantics and truth relative to a world

Michael Glanzberg*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

15 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper argues that relativity of truth to a world plays no significant role in empirical semantic theory, even as it is done in the model-theoretic tradition relying on intensional type theory. Some philosophical views of content provide an important notion of truth at a world, but they do not constrain the empirical domain of semantic theory in a way that makes this notion empirically significant. As an application of this conclusion, this paper shows that a potential motivation for relativism based on the relativity of truth to a world fails.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)281-307
Number of pages27
JournalSynthese
Volume166
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2009

Keywords

  • Content
  • Intensional logic
  • Possible worlds
  • Relativism
  • Semantic value
  • Semantics

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Social Sciences(all)

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