Sequential Information Design

Laura Doval, Jeffrey C. Ely*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

17 Scopus citations


We study games of incomplete information as both the information structure and the extensive form vary. An analyst may know the payoff-relevant data but not the players' private information, nor the extensive form that governs their play. Alternatively, a designer may be able to build a mechanism from these ingredients. We characterize all outcomes that can arise in an equilibrium of some extensive form with some information structure. We show how to specialize our main concept to capture the additional restrictions implied by extensive-form refinements.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)2575-2608
Number of pages34
Issue number6
StatePublished - Nov 2020


  • Bayes' correlated equilibrium
  • Coordinated equilibrium
  • extensive-form games
  • information design
  • information structure
  • perfect Bayesian equilibrium
  • robust predictions

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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