Signaling in a global game: Coordination and policy traps

George Marios Angeletos*, Christian Hellwig, Alessandro Pavan

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

105 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper introduces signaling in a global game so as to examine the informational role of policy in coordination environments such as currency crises and bank runs. While exogenous asymmetric information has been shown to select a unique equilibrium, we show that the endogenous information generated by policy interventions leads to multiple equilibria. The policy maker is thus trapped into a.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)452-484
Number of pages33
JournalJournal of Political Economy
Volume114
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1 2006

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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