Social Epistemic Normativity: The Program

Sanford C. Goldberg*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


In this paper I argue that epistemically normative claims regarding what one is permitted or required to believe (or to refrain from believing) are sometimes true in virtue of what we owe one another as social creatures. I do not here pursue a reduction of these epistemically normative claims to claims asserting one or another (ethical or social) interpersonal obligation, though I highlight some resources for those who would pursue such a reduction.

Original languageEnglish (US)
StateAccepted/In press - 2020


  • epistemology
  • norms
  • obligations
  • reduction
  • social epistemology

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • History and Philosophy of Science

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