Social Epistemic Normativity: The Program

Sanford C. Goldberg

doi:10.1017/epi.2019.54

Social Epistemic Normativity: The Program

Sanford C. Goldberg^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper I argue that epistemically normative claims regarding what one is permitted or required to believe (or to refrain from believing) are sometimes true in virtue of what we owe one another as social creatures. I do not here pursue a reduction of these epistemically normative claims to claims asserting one or another (ethical or social) interpersonal obligation, though I highlight some resources for those who would pursue such a reduction.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	364-383
Number of pages	20
Journal	Episteme
Volume	17
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2019.54
State	Published - Sep 1 2020

Keywords

epistemology
norms
obligations
reduction
social epistemology

ASJC Scopus subject areas

History and Philosophy of Science

Access to Document

10.1017/epi.2019.54

Cite this

@article{148d81e1abf840c6acab361e2aca43d8,

title = "Social Epistemic Normativity: The Program",

abstract = "In this paper I argue that epistemically normative claims regarding what one is permitted or required to believe (or to refrain from believing) are sometimes true in virtue of what we owe one another as social creatures. I do not here pursue a reduction of these epistemically normative claims to claims asserting one or another (ethical or social) interpersonal obligation, though I highlight some resources for those who would pursue such a reduction. ",

keywords = "epistemology, norms, obligations, reduction, social epistemology",

author = "Goldberg, {Sanford C.}",

note = "Publisher Copyright: Copyright {\textcopyright} The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press.",

year = "2020",

month = sep,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1017/epi.2019.54",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "17",

pages = "364--383",

journal = "Episteme",

issn = "1742-3600",

publisher = "Oxford University Press",

number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Social Epistemic Normativity

T2 - The Program

AU - Goldberg, Sanford C.

PY - 2020/9/1

Y1 - 2020/9/1

N2 - In this paper I argue that epistemically normative claims regarding what one is permitted or required to believe (or to refrain from believing) are sometimes true in virtue of what we owe one another as social creatures. I do not here pursue a reduction of these epistemically normative claims to claims asserting one or another (ethical or social) interpersonal obligation, though I highlight some resources for those who would pursue such a reduction.

AB - In this paper I argue that epistemically normative claims regarding what one is permitted or required to believe (or to refrain from believing) are sometimes true in virtue of what we owe one another as social creatures. I do not here pursue a reduction of these epistemically normative claims to claims asserting one or another (ethical or social) interpersonal obligation, though I highlight some resources for those who would pursue such a reduction.

KW - epistemology

KW - norms

KW - obligations

KW - reduction

KW - social epistemology

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85087353830&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85087353830&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1017/epi.2019.54

DO - 10.1017/epi.2019.54

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85087353830

SN - 1742-3600

VL - 17

SP - 364

EP - 383

JO - Episteme

JF - Episteme

IS - 3

ER -

Social Epistemic Normativity: The Program

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this