Social learning in recurring games

Matthew O. Jackson*, Ehud Kalai

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

33 Scopus citations

Abstract

In a recurring game, a stage game is played sequentially by different groups of players. Each group receives publicly available information about the play of earlier groups. Not knowing the population distribution of player types (representing individual preferences and behavior), society members start with a prior probability distribution over a set of possible type-distributions. Late groups update their beliefs by considering the public information regarding the play of earlier groups. We study the limit beliefs and play of late groups and the relationships to the true (realized) type-distribution and equilibria of the true Bayesian stage game.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, C73, D83.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)102-134
Number of pages33
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume21
Issue number1-2
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1997

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Social learning in recurring games'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this