Abstract
In a recurring game, a stage game is played sequentially by different groups of players. Each group receives publicly available information about the play of earlier groups. Not knowing the population distribution of player types (representing individual preferences and behavior), society members start with a prior probability distribution over a set of possible type-distributions. Late groups update their beliefs by considering the public information regarding the play of earlier groups. We study the limit beliefs and play of late groups and the relationships to the true (realized) type-distribution and equilibria of the true Bayesian stage game.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, C73, D83.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 102-134 |
| Number of pages | 33 |
| Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
| Volume | 21 |
| Issue number | 1-2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Oct 1997 |
Funding
* We are grateful to the California Institute of Technology for their generous hospitality while we undertook this research and we thank the National Science Foundation for ®nancial support under Grants SBR 9223156, SBR 9515421, and SBR 9507912. Ehud Kalai also thanks the Sherman Fairchild Foundation. We thank two anonymous referees for helpful suggestions. Luis Corchon, Ehud Lehrer, Glenn Loury, Roger Myerson, Lones Smith, and Xavier Vives provided helpful comments and conversations.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics