Some Ancient Greek and Twentieth-Century Theories of Value

Richard Kraut*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

Abstract

Plato puts goodness at the center of all practical thinking but offers no definition of it and implies that philosophy must find one. Aristotle demurs, arguing that there is no such thing as universal goodness. What we need, instead, is an understanding of the human good. Plato and Aristotle are alike in the attention they give to the category of the beneficial, and they agree that since some things are beneficial only as means, there must be others that are non-derivatively beneficial. When G. E. Moore proposed in the early twentieth century that goodness is, as Plato had said, the foundation of ethics, he rejected not only the assumption that goodness needs a definition, but also that goodness is beneficial - that is, good for someone. This article traces the development of this debate as it plays out in the writings of Prichard, Ross, Geach, Thomson, and Scanlon. c koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2020.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)374-385
Number of pages12
JournalGrazer Philosophische Studien
Volume97
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 2020

Keywords

  • Aristotle
  • Benefit
  • Good
  • Moore
  • Plato

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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