Some questions about the problem of the problem of induction

Fabrizio Cariani

doi:10.1017/epi.2015.13

Some questions about the problem of the problem of induction

Fabrizio Cariani^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Review article › peer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

White advances two central claims. The first is that a version of the problem of induction involves the reliability principle. Reliability principle: If S considers whether the methods or rules she followed in concluding P are reliable, and she is not justified in believing that they are reliable, then she is not justified in believing P.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	291-296
Number of pages	6
Journal	Episteme
Volume	12
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.13
State	Published - Jun 16 2015

ASJC Scopus subject areas

History and Philosophy of Science

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10.1017/epi.2015.13

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abstract = "White advances two central claims. The first is that a version of the problem of induction involves the reliability principle. Reliability principle: If S considers whether the methods or rules she followed in concluding P are reliable, and she is not justified in believing that they are reliable, then she is not justified in believing P.",

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Some questions about the problem of the problem of induction

Abstract

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