Sophisticated Sincerity: Voting Over Endogenous Agendas

David Austen-Smith*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

46 Scopus citations


The empirical findings on whether or not legislators vote strategically are mixed. This is at least partly due to the fact that to establish any hypothesis on strategic voting, legislators' preferences need to be known, and these are typically private data. I show that under complete information, if decision making is by the amendment procedure and if the agenda is set endogenously, then sophisticated (strategic) voting over the resulting agenda is observationally equivalent to sincere voting. The voting strategies, however, are sophisticated. This fact has direct implications for empirical work on sophisticated voting.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1323-1330
Number of pages8
JournalAmerican Political Science Review
Issue number4
StatePublished - Jan 1 1987

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science


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