TY - GEN
T1 - Spot Markets for Spectrum Measurements
AU - Ghosh, Arnob
AU - Berry, Randall
N1 - Funding Information:
This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation grants AST-1547328, and CNS-1701921. 1In the first round of applications, six different companies requested FCC approval as SAS operators [2]. 2In the first round, three different ESCs were approved by the FCC [3].
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 IEEE.
PY - 2019/11
Y1 - 2019/11
N2 - The recent framework for spectrum sharing in the 3.5 GHz band allows for Environment Sensing Capability operators (ESCs) to measure spectrum occupancy so as to enable commercial use of this spectrum when federal incumbent users are not present. Each ESC will contract with one or more Spectrum Access Systems (SASs) to provide spectrum occupancy data. Commercial firms using the band will in turn contract with a SAS to determine when it can access the spectrum. Initially, the decisions of which ESC and SAS to partner with will likely be based on long-term contracts. In this paper, we consider an alternative framework, in which an ESC sells its spectrum management information via a spot market so that from period-to-period a commercial user can select a different ESC from which to acquire spectrum measurements. We develop a game theoretic model to analyze such a market and show that using such a spot market may better enable multiple commercial firms to operate in a given spectrum band. We also show that this increased competition may not benefit consumer surplus unless firms adopt a non-stationary strategy profile.
AB - The recent framework for spectrum sharing in the 3.5 GHz band allows for Environment Sensing Capability operators (ESCs) to measure spectrum occupancy so as to enable commercial use of this spectrum when federal incumbent users are not present. Each ESC will contract with one or more Spectrum Access Systems (SASs) to provide spectrum occupancy data. Commercial firms using the band will in turn contract with a SAS to determine when it can access the spectrum. Initially, the decisions of which ESC and SAS to partner with will likely be based on long-term contracts. In this paper, we consider an alternative framework, in which an ESC sells its spectrum management information via a spot market so that from period-to-period a commercial user can select a different ESC from which to acquire spectrum measurements. We develop a game theoretic model to analyze such a market and show that using such a spot market may better enable multiple commercial firms to operate in a given spectrum band. We also show that this increased competition may not benefit consumer surplus unless firms adopt a non-stationary strategy profile.
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U2 - 10.1109/DySPAN.2019.8935666
DO - 10.1109/DySPAN.2019.8935666
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85078002081
T3 - 2019 IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks, DySPAN 2019
BT - 2019 IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks, DySPAN 2019
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 2019 IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks, DySPAN 2019
Y2 - 11 November 2019 through 14 November 2019
ER -