Stability in large Bayesian games with heterogeneous players

Joyee Deb*, Ehud Kalai

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

Bayesian Nash equilibria that fail to be hindsight-(or, alternatively, ex-post) stable do not provide reliable predictions of outcomes of games in many applications. We characterize a family of large Bayesian games (with many players) in which all equilibria are asymptotically hindsight-stable, and discuss the consequences of this robustness property. In contrast to earlier literature, we establish hindsight stability in a class of games in which players are not anonymous and type spaces and action spaces can be infinite.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1041-1055
Number of pages15
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume157
DOIs
StatePublished - May 1 2015

Keywords

  • Bayesian nash equilibria
  • Ex-post nash equilibria
  • Hindsight stability
  • Large games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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