@article{d412902c22964d8bbabcdb3793c69d15,
title = "Standard setting organisations and standard essential patents: Voting and markets",
abstract = "The analysis provides conditions under which standard setting organisations (SSOs) choose efficient technology standards. I introduce a two-stage game with both voting and market competition. In equilibrium, standards and market outcomes are efficient even with market power from scarce capacity and standard essential patents (SEPs). I show that a drastic innovation with SEPs generates greater social welfare than a less efficient standard without SEPs. A key finding is that voting power and market power have counterbalancing effects. The discussion helps explain empirical observation of differences in SSO voting rules, intellectual property (IP) rules, membership and alliances.",
author = "Spulber, {Daniel F.}",
note = "Funding Information: I gratefully acknowledge research support from Qualcomm, the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation and the Kellogg School of Management. I thank Pere Arqu{\'e}-Castells, Justus Baron, Dennis Carlton, Jorge Contreras, Manfred Holler, Ehud Kalai, Nicola Persico, Michael Riordan and Yossi Spiegel for helpful comments. I thank Jean Tirole for very helpful comments on the article as a conference discussant. I am also grateful for helpful comments from participants at the Harvard Business School Technology and Operations Management seminar, the Kellogg Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences seminar and the Ninth Annual Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy Conference at the Searle Center on Law, Regulation and Economic Growth, Northwestern University. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2018 Royal Economic Society.",
year = "2019",
month = apr,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1111/ecoj.12606",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "129",
pages = "1477--1509",
journal = "Economic Journal",
issn = "0013-0133",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "619",
}