Standard setting organisations and standard essential patents: Voting and markets

Daniel F. Spulber*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

The analysis provides conditions under which standard setting organisations (SSOs) choose efficient technology standards. I introduce a two-stage game with both voting and market competition. In equilibrium, standards and market outcomes are efficient even with market power from scarce capacity and standard essential patents (SEPs). I show that a drastic innovation with SEPs generates greater social welfare than a less efficient standard without SEPs. A key finding is that voting power and market power have counterbalancing effects. The discussion helps explain empirical observation of differences in SSO voting rules, intellectual property (IP) rules, membership and alliances.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1477-1509
Number of pages33
JournalEconomic Journal
Volume129
Issue number619
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1 2019

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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