Starting high and ending with nothing: The role of anchors and power in negotiations

Martin Schweinsberg*, Gillian Ku, Cynthia S. Wang, Madan M. Pillutla

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

27 Scopus citations

Abstract

Most research suggests that negotiators gain value by making first offers in negotiations. The current research examines the proposition that extreme first offers offend their recipients and cause them to walk away, resulting in an impasse. Results across two experiments support this proposition. As a result, extreme offers can be risky: even though they can anchor counteroffers and final outcomes, bringing benefit to the offerer, they only do so when impasses are avoided. In addition, we find support for the proposition that power moderates the relationship between extreme offers and impasses: although low- and high-power negotiators are equally offended by extreme offers, it is the low-power negotiators who walk away from the negotiation.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)226-231
Number of pages6
JournalJournal of Experimental Social Psychology
Volume48
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2012

Keywords

  • Anchor
  • First offer
  • Impasse
  • Negotiation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Psychology
  • Sociology and Political Science

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