Strategic information revelation in crowdsourcing systems without verification

Chao Huang, Haoran Yu, Jianwei Huang*, Randall A. Berry

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We study a crowdsourcing problem where the platform aims to incentivize distributed workers to provide high-quality and truthful solutions without the ability to verify the solutions. While most prior work assumes that the platform and workers have symmetric information, we study an asymmetric information scenario where the platform has informational advantages. Specifically, the platform knows more information regarding workers' average solution accuracy, and can strategically reveal such information to workers. Workers will utilize the announced information to determine the likelihood that they obtain a reward if exerting effort on the task. We study two types of workers: (1) naive workers who fully trust the announcement, and (2) strategic workers who update prior belief based on the announcement. For naive workers, we show that the platform should always announce a high average accuracy to maximize its payoff. However, this is not always optimal for strategic workers, as it may reduce the credibility of the platform's announcement and hence reduce the platform's payoff. Interestingly, the platform may have an incentive to even announce an average accuracy lower than the actual value when facing strategic workers. Another counter-intuitive result is that the platform's payoff may decrease in the number of high-accuracy workers.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationINFOCOM 2021 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Electronic)9780738112817
DOIs
StatePublished - May 10 2021
Event40th IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, INFOCOM 2021 - Vancouver, Canada
Duration: May 10 2021May 13 2021

Publication series

NameProceedings - IEEE INFOCOM
Volume2021-May
ISSN (Print)0743-166X

Conference

Conference40th IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, INFOCOM 2021
Country/TerritoryCanada
CityVancouver
Period5/10/215/13/21

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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