Strategic Voting

Timothy James Feddersen

Strategic Voting

Managerial Economics, Decision Sciences and Operations

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Entry for encyclopedia/dictionary

Abstract

Strategic voting in elections occurs when a voter submits a ballot in an election with the intention of maximizing the likelihood of a good election outcome given his expectation of how others are voting. Strategic voting is typically contrasted with sincere voting. When election rules permit ballots that amount to a rank ordering of alternatives, a voter is said to vote sincerely if his ballot ranks more preferred alternatives above less preferred ones. There is evidence of strategic voting in real elections, and an extensive theoretical literature demonstrates incentives for strategic voting under almost all election rules.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
Editors	Steven N. Durlauf, Lawrence E. Blume
Publisher	Palgrave Macmillan
Edition	2nd
State	Published - 2008

Access to Document

http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_S000531

Cite this

@inbook{da26c7e32e514778bb1f664062e704c1,

title = "Strategic Voting",

abstract = "Strategic voting in elections occurs when a voter submits a ballot in an election with the intention of maximizing the likelihood of a good election outcome given his expectation of how others are voting. Strategic voting is typically contrasted with sincere voting. When election rules permit ballots that amount to a rank ordering of alternatives, a voter is said to vote sincerely if his ballot ranks more preferred alternatives above less preferred ones. There is evidence of strategic voting in real elections, and an extensive theoretical literature demonstrates incentives for strategic voting under almost all election rules.",

author = "Feddersen, {Timothy James}",

year = "2008",

language = "English (US)",

editor = "Durlauf, {Steven N.} and Blume, {Lawrence E.}",

booktitle = "The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics",

publisher = "Palgrave Macmillan",

edition = "2nd",

}

TY - CHAP

T1 - Strategic Voting

AU - Feddersen, Timothy James

PY - 2008

Y1 - 2008

N2 - Strategic voting in elections occurs when a voter submits a ballot in an election with the intention of maximizing the likelihood of a good election outcome given his expectation of how others are voting. Strategic voting is typically contrasted with sincere voting. When election rules permit ballots that amount to a rank ordering of alternatives, a voter is said to vote sincerely if his ballot ranks more preferred alternatives above less preferred ones. There is evidence of strategic voting in real elections, and an extensive theoretical literature demonstrates incentives for strategic voting under almost all election rules.

AB - Strategic voting in elections occurs when a voter submits a ballot in an election with the intention of maximizing the likelihood of a good election outcome given his expectation of how others are voting. Strategic voting is typically contrasted with sincere voting. When election rules permit ballots that amount to a rank ordering of alternatives, a voter is said to vote sincerely if his ballot ranks more preferred alternatives above less preferred ones. There is evidence of strategic voting in real elections, and an extensive theoretical literature demonstrates incentives for strategic voting under almost all election rules.

M3 - Entry for encyclopedia/dictionary

BT - The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

A2 - Durlauf, Steven N.

A2 - Blume, Lawrence E.

PB - Palgrave Macmillan

ER -

Strategic Voting

Abstract

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Cite this