Strategically stable equilibria in games with infinitely many pure strategies

Nabil Al-Najjar*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

16 Scopus citations


This paper studies the notion of Strategic Stability (Kohlberg and Mertens (Econometrica, 1986, 54, 1003-1039)) in games with compact metric spaces of pure strategies and continuous payoff functions. It is shown that stable sets exist and satisfy versions of the properties of admissibility, forward induction and elimination of dominated strategies.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)151-164
Number of pages14
JournalMathematical social sciences
Issue number2
StatePublished - Apr 1995


  • Forward induction
  • Perfect equilibria
  • Strategic stability

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Psychology(all)
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty


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