Strategically stable equilibria in games with infinitely many pure strategies

Nabil Al-Najjar

doi:10.1016/0165-4896(94)00765-Z

Strategically stable equilibria in games with infinitely many pure strategies

Nabil Al-Najjar^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Managerial Economics, Decision Sciences and Operations

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

16 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper studies the notion of Strategic Stability (Kohlberg and Mertens (Econometrica, 1986, 54, 1003-1039)) in games with compact metric spaces of pure strategies and continuous payoff functions. It is shown that stable sets exist and satisfy versions of the properties of admissibility, forward induction and elimination of dominated strategies.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	151-164
Number of pages	14
Journal	Mathematical social sciences
Volume	29
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(94)00765-Z
State	Published - Apr 1995

Keywords

Forward induction
Perfect equilibria
Strategic stability

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Sociology and Political Science
Social Sciences(all)
Psychology(all)
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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10.1016/0165-4896(94)00765-Z

Cite this

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abstract = "This paper studies the notion of Strategic Stability (Kohlberg and Mertens (Econometrica, 1986, 54, 1003-1039)) in games with compact metric spaces of pure strategies and continuous payoff functions. It is shown that stable sets exist and satisfy versions of the properties of admissibility, forward induction and elimination of dominated strategies.",

keywords = "Forward induction, Perfect equilibria, Strategic stability",

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AB - This paper studies the notion of Strategic Stability (Kohlberg and Mertens (Econometrica, 1986, 54, 1003-1039)) in games with compact metric spaces of pure strategies and continuous payoff functions. It is shown that stable sets exist and satisfy versions of the properties of admissibility, forward induction and elimination of dominated strategies.

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KW - Strategic stability

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Strategically stable equilibria in games with infinitely many pure strategies

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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