Abstract
This paper studies the notion of Strategic Stability (Kohlberg and Mertens (Econometrica, 1986, 54, 1003-1039)) in games with compact metric spaces of pure strategies and continuous payoff functions. It is shown that stable sets exist and satisfy versions of the properties of admissibility, forward induction and elimination of dominated strategies.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 151-164 |
Number of pages | 14 |
Journal | Mathematical social sciences |
Volume | 29 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Apr 1995 |
Keywords
- Forward induction
- Perfect equilibria
- Strategic stability
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Sociology and Political Science
- General Social Sciences
- General Psychology
- Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty