Strategy-proof location on a network

James Schummer*, Rakesh V. Vohra

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

92 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider rules that choose a location on a graph (e.g. a road network) based on agents' single-peaked preferences. First, we characterize the class of strategy-proof, onto rules when the graph is a tree. Such a rule is based on a collection of generalized median voter rules (Moulin, 1980) satisfying a consistency condition. Second, we characterize such rules for graphs containing cycles. We show that while such a rule is not necessarily dictatorial, the existence of a cycle grants some agent an amount of decisive power, unlike the case of trees. Rules for this case can be described in terms of a subclass of such rules for trees. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D78.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)405-428
Number of pages24
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume104
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 2002

Keywords

  • Graph
  • Single-peaked preferences
  • Strategy-proof
  • Tree

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Strategy-proof location on a network'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this