Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions

Mark Allen Satterthwaite*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1375 Scopus citations

Abstract

Consider a committee which must select one alternative from a set of three or more alternatives. Committee members each cast a ballot which the voting procedure counts. The voting procedure is strategy-proof if it always induces every committee member to cast a ballot revealing his preference. I prove three theorems. First, every strategy-proof voting procedure is dictatorial. Second, this paper's strategy-proofness condition for voting procedures corresponds to Arrow's rationality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, non-negative response, and citizens' sovereignty conditions for social welfare functions. Third, Arrow's general possibility theorem is proven in a new manner.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)187-217
Number of pages31
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume10
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1975

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this