Strategy-proofness and markets

Mark A. Satterthwaite*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

If a market is considered to be a social choice function, then the domain of admissible preferences is restricted and standard social choice theorems do not apply. A substantial body of analysis, however, strongly supports the notion that attractive strategy-proof social choice functions do not exist in market settings. Yet price theory, which implicitly assumes the strategy-proofness of markets, performs quite well in describing many real markets. This paper resolves this paradox in two steps. First, given that a market is not strategy-proof, it should be modeled as a Bayesian game of incomplete information. Second, a double auction market, which is perhaps the simplest operationalization of supply and demand as a Bayesian game, is approximately strategy-proof even when the number of traders on each side of the market is quite moderate.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)37-58
Number of pages22
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume18
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2001

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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