Strategy-proofness versus efficiency for small domains of preferences over public goods

James Schummer*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

18 Scopus citations


It has long been known that when agents have von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over lotteries, there is an incompatibility between strategy-proofness and efficiency (Gibbard, [9]; Hylland, [12]) - a solution satisfying those properties must be dictatorial. We strengthen this result by showing that it follows from the same incompatibility on a series of much smaller domains of preferences. Specifically, we first show the incompatibility to hold on our smallest domain, in which two agents are restricted to have linear preferences over one private good and one public good produced from the private good (Kolm triangle economies). This result then implies the same incompatibility on increasingly larger domains of preferences, ending finally with the class of von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over lotteries.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)709-722
Number of pages14
JournalEconomic Theory
Issue number3
StatePublished - Jan 1 1999


  • Lotteries
  • Public goods
  • Strategyproof

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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