Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies

James Schummer*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

51 Scopus citations

Abstract

Strategy-proofness has been shown to be a strong property, particularly on large domains of preferences. We therefore examine the existence of strategy-proof and efficient solutions on restricted, 2-person domains of exchange economies. On the class of 2-person exchange economies in which agents have homothetic, strictly convex preferences we show, as Zhou (1991) did for a larger domain, that such a solution is necessarily dictatorial. As this proof requires preferences exhibiting high degrees of complementarity, our search continues to a class of linear preferences. Even on this "small

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)47-56
Number of pages10
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume14
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1996

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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