Strong belief and forward induction reasoning

Pierpaolo Battigalli*, Marciano Siniscalchi

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

164 Scopus citations


We provide a unified epistemic analysis of some forward-induction solution concepts in games with complete and incomplete information. We suggest that forward induction reasoning may be usefully interpreted as a set of assumptions governing the players' belief revision processes, and define a notion of strong belief to formalize these assumptions. Building on the notion of strong belief, we provide an epistemic characterization of extensive-form rationalizability and the intuitive criterion, as well as sufficient epistemic conditions for the backward induction outcome in generic games with perfect information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)356-391
Number of pages36
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number2
StatePublished - Oct 1 2002


  • Conditional belief
  • Forward induction
  • Intuitive criterion
  • Rationalizability
  • Strong belief

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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