Subjective uncertainty over behavior strategies: A correction

Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg*, David K. Levine

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

13 Scopus citations


In order to model the subjective uncertainty of a player over the behavior strategies of an opponent, one must consider the player's beliefs about the opponent's play at information sets that the player thinks have probability zero. This corregendum uses "trembles" to provide a definition of the convex hull of a set of behavior strategies. This corrects a definition we gave in [E. Dekel, D. Fudenberg, and D. K. Levine, 1999, J. Econ. Theory 89, 165-185], which led to two of the solution concepts we defined there not having the properties we intended. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82, C610.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)473-478
Number of pages6
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number2
StatePublished - 2002


  • Behavior strategies
  • Extensive-form games
  • Rationalizability
  • Self-confirming equilibrium
  • Subjective uncertainty

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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