Abstract
In order to model the subjective uncertainty of a player over the behavior strategies of an opponent, one must consider the player's beliefs about the opponent's play at information sets that the player thinks have probability zero. This corregendum uses "trembles" to provide a definition of the convex hull of a set of behavior strategies. This corrects a definition we gave in [E. Dekel, D. Fudenberg, and D. K. Levine, 1999, J. Econ. Theory 89, 165-185], which led to two of the solution concepts we defined there not having the properties we intended. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82, C610.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 473-478 |
Number of pages | 6 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
Volume | 104 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2002 |
Funding
1This work was supported by the National Science Foundation under Grants 99-86170, 97-30181, and 97-30943. Please send correspondence to: Drew Fudenberg, Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138.
Keywords
- Behavior strategies
- Extensive-form games
- Rationalizability
- Self-confirming equilibrium
- Subjective uncertainty
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics