Subjective uncertainty over behavior strategies: A correction

Eddie Dekel; Drew Fudenberg; David K. Levine

doi:10.1006/jeth.2001.2866

Subjective uncertainty over behavior strategies: A correction

Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg^*, David K. Levine

^*Corresponding author for this work

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

15 Scopus citations

Abstract

In order to model the subjective uncertainty of a player over the behavior strategies of an opponent, one must consider the player's beliefs about the opponent's play at information sets that the player thinks have probability zero. This corregendum uses "trembles" to provide a definition of the convex hull of a set of behavior strategies. This corrects a definition we gave in [E. Dekel, D. Fudenberg, and D. K. Levine, 1999, J. Econ. Theory 89, 165-185], which led to two of the solution concepts we defined there not having the properties we intended. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82, C610.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	473-478
Number of pages	6
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	104
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2866
State	Published - 2002

Funding

1This work was supported by the National Science Foundation under Grants 99-86170, 97-30181, and 97-30943. Please send correspondence to: Drew Fudenberg, Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138.

Keywords

Behavior strategies
Extensive-form games
Rationalizability
Self-confirming equilibrium
Subjective uncertainty

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1006/jeth.2001.2866

Cite this

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title = "Subjective uncertainty over behavior strategies: A correction",

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keywords = "Behavior strategies, Extensive-form games, Rationalizability, Self-confirming equilibrium, Subjective uncertainty",

author = "Eddie Dekel and Drew Fudenberg and Levine, {David K.}",

note = "Funding Information: 1This work was supported by the National Science Foundation under Grants 99-86170, 97-30181, and 97-30943. Please send correspondence to: Drew Fudenberg, Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138.",

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AU - Dekel, Eddie

AU - Fudenberg, Drew

AU - Levine, David K.

N1 - Funding Information: 1This work was supported by the National Science Foundation under Grants 99-86170, 97-30181, and 97-30943. Please send correspondence to: Drew Fudenberg, Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138.

PY - 2002

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N2 - In order to model the subjective uncertainty of a player over the behavior strategies of an opponent, one must consider the player's beliefs about the opponent's play at information sets that the player thinks have probability zero. This corregendum uses "trembles" to provide a definition of the convex hull of a set of behavior strategies. This corrects a definition we gave in [E. Dekel, D. Fudenberg, and D. K. Levine, 1999, J. Econ. Theory 89, 165-185], which led to two of the solution concepts we defined there not having the properties we intended. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82, C610.

AB - In order to model the subjective uncertainty of a player over the behavior strategies of an opponent, one must consider the player's beliefs about the opponent's play at information sets that the player thinks have probability zero. This corregendum uses "trembles" to provide a definition of the convex hull of a set of behavior strategies. This corrects a definition we gave in [E. Dekel, D. Fudenberg, and D. K. Levine, 1999, J. Econ. Theory 89, 165-185], which led to two of the solution concepts we defined there not having the properties we intended. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82, C610.

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KW - Rationalizability

KW - Self-confirming equilibrium

KW - Subjective uncertainty

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Subjective uncertainty over behavior strategies: A correction

Abstract

Funding

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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