Abstract
An axiomatized theory of nonlinear utility and subjective probability is presented in which assessed probabilities are allowed to depend on the consequences associated with events. The representation includes the expected utility model as a special case, but can accommodate the Ellsberg paradox and other types of ambiguity sensitive behavior, while retaining familiar properties of subjective probability, such as additivity for disjoint events and multiplication of conditional probabilities. It is an extension, to the states model of decision making under uncertainty, of Chew's weighted linear utility representation for decision making under risk.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 261-282 |
Number of pages | 22 |
Journal | Theory and Decision |
Volume | 23 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Nov 1987 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- General Decision Sciences
- Developmental and Educational Psychology
- Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
- Applied Psychology
- General Social Sciences
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
- Computer Science Applications