Team Negotiation: An Examination of Integrative and Distributive Bargaining

Leigh Thompson*, Erika Peterson, Susan E. Brodt

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

104 Scopus citations

Abstract

Two experiments compared the effectiveness of team and solo negotiators in integrative and distributive bargaining. When at least 1 party to a negotiation was a team, joint profit increased. Teams, more than solos, developed mutually beneficial trade-offs among issues and discovered compatible interests. The presence of at least 1 team increased information exchange and accuracy in judgments about the other party's interests in comparison with solo negotiations. The belief by both teams and solos that teams have a relative advantage over solo opponents was not supported by actual outcomes. Unexpectedly, neither private meetings nor friendships among team members improved the team's advantage. Teams of friends made less accurate judgments and reached fewer integrative agreements compared to teams of nonfriends.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)66-78
Number of pages13
JournalJournal of personality and social psychology
Volume70
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1996

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Psychology
  • Sociology and Political Science

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