The Allocation of Future Business: Dynamic Relational Contracts with Multiple Agents

Isaiah Andrews, Daniel Vincent Barron

Research output: Working paper

Abstract

Consider a repeated moral hazard problem involving a principal and several agents. If formal contracts are unavailable and agents observe only their own relationships, an optimal relational contract allocates business among agents depending on past performance. If first-best is attainable, the principal favors an agent who performs well with future business, even if he later performs poorly. The agent loses favor only if he cannot produce and a replacement performs well. If first-best is unattainable, some relationships may deteriorate into persistent low effort. In the first best, the principal need not conceal information from agents; otherwise, she optimally conceals information.
Original languageEnglish (US)
Number of pages50
StatePublished - Apr 21 2014

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