The claiming effect: Why players are more generous in social dilemmas than in ultimatum games

Richard P. Larrick*, Sally Blount

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

93 Scopus citations

Abstract

The term procedural frames is introduced and defined as different representations of structurally equivalent allocation processes. Study 1 compared 2 well-known games, sequential social dilemmas and ultimatum bargaining, that share the same structure: Player 1 creates an allocation of a resource and Player 2 decides whether to allow it or deny it. Study 1 found that Player 1 made more favorable allocations and Player 2 accepted more unfavorable allocations in a social dilemma frame than in an equivalent ultimatum bargaining frame. Study 2 revealed the critical determinant was whether Player 2 had to respond to an allocation by accepting or rejecting it (as in the ultimatum game) or by making a claim (as in the social dilemma). Two additional studies explored how these actions are perceived. The inconsistency of behavior across procedural frames raises methodological concerns but illuminates construal processes that guide allocation.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)810-825
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of personality and social psychology
Volume72
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1997

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Psychology
  • Sociology and Political Science

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