The design of patent pools: The determinants of licensing rules

Josh Lerner*, Marcin Strojwas, Jean Tirole

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

62 Scopus citations

Abstract

Patent pools are an important but little-studied economic institution. In this article, we first make a set of predictions about the licensing terms associated with Patent pools. The theoretical framework predicts that (i) pools consisting of complementary patents are more likely to allow members to engage in independent licensing and (ii) the requirement that firms license patents to the pool (grantbacks) should be associated with pools that consist of complements and allow independent licensing. We then examine the terms of 63 pools, and show that licensing rules are consistent with these hypotheses.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)610-625
Number of pages16
JournalRAND Journal of Economics
Volume38
Issue number3
StatePublished - Sep 1 2007

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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