The design of patent pools: The determinants of licensing rules

Josh Lerner*, Marcin Strojwas, Jean Tirole

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    64 Scopus citations

    Abstract

    Patent pools are an important but little-studied economic institution. In this article, we first make a set of predictions about the licensing terms associated with Patent pools. The theoretical framework predicts that (i) pools consisting of complementary patents are more likely to allow members to engage in independent licensing and (ii) the requirement that firms license patents to the pool (grantbacks) should be associated with pools that consist of complements and allow independent licensing. We then examine the terms of 63 pools, and show that licensing rules are consistent with these hypotheses.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)610-625
    Number of pages16
    JournalRAND Journal of Economics
    Volume38
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 2007

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

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