The economics of bundling content with unlicensed wireless service

Yining Zhu*, Haoran Yu, Randall Berry

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Adding new unlicensed wireless spectrum is a promising approach to accommodate increasing traffic demand. However, unlicensed spectrum may have a high risk of becoming congested, and service providers (SPs) may have difficulty to differentiate their wireless services when offering them on the same unlicensed spectrum. When SPs offer identical services, the resulting competition can lead to zero profits. In this work, we consider the case where an SP bundles its wireless service with a content service. We show that this can differentiate the SPs' services and lead to positive SP profits. In particular, we study the characteristics of the content services that an SP should bundle with its wireless service, and analyze the impact of bundling on consumer surplus.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationGame Theory for Networks - 8th International EAI Conference, GameNets 2019, Proceedings
EditorsAnastasios Giovanidis, Konstantin Avrachenkov, Longbo Huang, Jason R. Marden, Marceau Coupechoux
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages93-108
Number of pages16
ISBN (Print)9783030169886
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2019
Event8th EAI International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets 2019 - Paris, France
Duration: Apr 25 2019Apr 26 2019

Publication series

NameLecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, LNICST
Volume277
ISSN (Print)1867-8211

Conference

Conference8th EAI International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets 2019
CountryFrance
CityParis
Period4/25/194/26/19

Keywords

  • Bundling
  • Game theory
  • Unlicensed spectrum market

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications

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  • Cite this

    Zhu, Y., Yu, H., & Berry, R. (2019). The economics of bundling content with unlicensed wireless service. In A. Giovanidis, K. Avrachenkov, L. Huang, J. R. Marden, & M. Coupechoux (Eds.), Game Theory for Networks - 8th International EAI Conference, GameNets 2019, Proceedings (pp. 93-108). (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, LNICST; Vol. 277). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16989-3_7