The economics of bundling content with unlicensed wireless service

Yining Zhu*, Haoran Yu, Randall Berry

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution


Adding new unlicensed wireless spectrum is a promising approach to accommodate increasing traffic demand. However, unlicensed spectrum may have a high risk of becoming congested, and service providers (SPs) may have difficulty to differentiate their wireless services when offering them on the same unlicensed spectrum. When SPs offer identical services, the resulting competition can lead to zero profits. In this work, we consider the case where an SP bundles its wireless service with a content service. We show that this can differentiate the SPs' services and lead to positive SP profits. In particular, we study the characteristics of the content services that an SP should bundle with its wireless service, and analyze the impact of bundling on consumer surplus.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationGame Theory for Networks - 8th International EAI Conference, GameNets 2019, Proceedings
EditorsAnastasios Giovanidis, Konstantin Avrachenkov, Longbo Huang, Jason R. Marden, Marceau Coupechoux
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Number of pages16
ISBN (Print)9783030169886
StatePublished - 2019
Event8th EAI International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets 2019 - Paris, France
Duration: Apr 25 2019Apr 26 2019

Publication series

NameLecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, LNICST
ISSN (Print)1867-8211


Conference8th EAI International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets 2019


  • Bundling
  • Game theory
  • Unlicensed spectrum market

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications


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