Abstract
Many incentives in organizations arise not through explicit formal incentive contracts but rather implicitly through career concerns. This paper models career concerns through agents trying to manipulate the market assessment of their future productivity. The information flow from current actions to market assessment is therefore crucial in determining the nature of these incentives. Improved information may either increase or reduce incentives. The impact of information provides a major distinction between the explicit and implicit incentives model. The paper derives general results on comparisons of information structures which serve as counterparts to the standard results on information structures in the principal-agent model: sufficient statistic, impact of a Blackwell garbling, comparison of inclusive information structures.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 183-198 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | Review of Economic Studies |
| Volume | 66 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 1999 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Funding
Acknowledgements. The authors are grateful to Patrick Bolton, Juan Carrillo, Patrick Rey and a referee for helpful comments. Mathias Dewatripont acknowledges support from contract P4/28 of the Interuniversity Poles of Attraction Programme of the Belgian Federal State (Prime Minister's Office, Federal Office for Scientific, Technical and Cultural Affairs). Ian Jewitt acknowledges support from the ESRC.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics